Richmond’s rebuild has been discussed almost entirely through the best 23: who belongs in the midfield, which young tall starts forward, whether the next defender is ready, how many veterans should remain, and what the strongest side looks like once the injury list stops resembling a casualty clearing station. It is a natural way to think about football, and it is also incomplete.

The Tigers’ real problem is not simply that the best 23 has been unavailable. It is that the side outside the best 23 has too often required the whole structure to be rewritten. Richmond used more players than any other AFL club through the opening quarter of the 2026 season, a reflection of injuries that had already forced the club into constant selection change. By early May, the injury list had reached 17, leaving only four healthy players outside the AFL squad and requiring Richmond’s VFL team to name just three AFL-listed players for one match. That is extreme disruption. But it also exposed a broader issue that will remain relevant even when the injury list becomes more sensible: Richmond has not yet built a system portable enough to survive ordinary AFL absences.

That is why 2027 should not be framed only as a search for the best team. It should be a search for the best 30.

A good best 23 can win a few games when everything goes right. A good 30 allows a club to survive a sore ruckman, a managed midfielder, a key defender missing a fortnight, a wing unavailable after a heavy workload or a young forward needing time before he is ready for the next senior demand. More importantly, a good 30 allows the team to retain its identity when those changes occur. The replacement does not need to be the same player. He needs to understand the same role well enough that the structure does not begin again from scratch.

This is the consequence of Richmond’s recent injury experience. The club cannot simply hope that better health will restore coherence. It has to use the next phase of the rebuild to create a wider senior group that understands the same football language: how the midfield protects defensive side, how the wings connect and recover, how the forwards make an entry defensible, how the backline holds its line and how each player responds when the first plan fails.

The Tigers do not need 30 stars. They need 30 players who know what the team is trying to do.

The best 23 is a flattering fiction

The best-23 conversation survives because it is comforting. It gives supporters a clean picture of the future. Put the most talented players in their preferred positions, assume they are all fit, imagine the forward line functioning, the midfield balanced and the defence settled. It is football as a showroom floor: polished, orderly and untouched by the minor disasters that normally occupy a season.

The problem is that no AFL side plays its best 23 every week.

Even strong clubs make changes through injury, suspension, management, form, tactical selection and the mundane unpredictability of a long season. The difference between a mature side and a developing one is not that the mature side avoids changes. It is that the mature side can make changes without losing the underlying shape of its game.

Richmond has not consistently had that luxury. The club’s 2026 season repeatedly forced it to select from availability rather than from a settled strategic plan. The Tigers’ injury update in June listed Sam Lalor with a partial Achilles tear, Josh Smillie with a re-torn quad, Jonty Faull out for the season with back stress fractures, Harry Armstrong managing foot bone stress, Jacob Hopper dealing with a stress fracture in his ankle, Tom Sims with an MCL injury and several other players unavailable or under managed return timelines. Earlier, the injury list had been swollen enough to affect the VFL program itself.

The immediate effect was obvious: the senior side lost talent, experience and positional balance.

The deeper effect was that Richmond repeatedly lost the ability to select like a coherent team.

A midfielder unavailable does not simply create a midfield vacancy. It may move a forward into the wing, an outside player into the centre bounce, a senior player into a heavier workload and a defender into a more conservative role because the midfield protection has weakened. A tall forward missing does not simply mean one less marking target. It can change the spacing of the entire forward line, alter the quality of Richmond’s inside-50 entries, reduce ground-level pressure after an intercept and make the half-backs more cautious because the ball is no longer being retained in the forward half.

That is how an injury list becomes a system problem.

The normal response is to say that depth has been exposed. Again, true but not precise enough. Depth is not merely having another player capable of filling a position. It is having another player who can perform the responsibility attached to that position without requiring everyone around him to change theirs.

Richmond’s next step must be to create that kind of depth. The club needs replacements who can preserve the function even when they cannot replicate the player. If Taranto is managed or unavailable, Richmond does not need another Taranto to appear. It needs enough midfield structure that the remaining group can distribute his functions: one player wins more of the hard ball, one provides the release, one protects defensive side and one supplies the outside connection. If a key forward is unavailable, Richmond does not need another identical tall. It needs a forward system that can change the entry type, use a high connector, retain ground-ball pressure and prevent the opponent from turning every intercept into a clean rebound.

The difference is between depth as names and depth as knowledge.

Richmond’s list is young enough that depth must be taught

Richmond entered 2026 as the AFL’s third-youngest list, with an average age of 23.8 and an average of 58.7 games per player. The Tigers had 29 players with fewer than 50 games, equal with West Coast for the most inexperienced list profile in the competition. That age and experience profile means depth cannot be assumed. It has to be constructed.

A young list naturally contains players who are still discovering their best position, learning the physical requirements of senior football and developing the ability to execute skills under pressure. That is normal. Richmond’s challenge is that so many players are at that stage simultaneously. The club is not simply introducing one young player into a mature side. It is trying to build a new generation while the older one gradually recedes.

The 2024 draft group illustrates the scale of the project. Richmond took a large collection of early selections across that intake, and the club hoped to develop a core that could grow together. The potential was obvious: Lalor’s power, Smillie’s size and composure, Taj Hotton’s skill and attacking versatility, Faull and Armstrong’s tall-forward potential, Luke Trainor’s defensive poise, and the broader group around them.

But the promise of a large draft class is not that every player becomes a star. It is that the group can create internal depth. One player can cover a role because he has learned the same structures as another. One can shift forward without leaving the midfield empty because there is a teammate who understands the same centre-bounce responsibility. One defender can be managed without forcing the whole backline into emergency football because another player has been trained to occupy the safety role.

Richmond has not yet had enough continuity to build that internal redundancy. Every member of the 2024 draft class dealt with injury at some stage in 2026. From the seven Richmond selections made before pick 30 in that draft, only Trainor was healthy by the middle of the season. That reduced more than individual game totals. It interrupted the chance to teach the group the same football language at the same time.

This is why the best-30 project has to become deliberate. Richmond cannot wait for depth to emerge organically from a young group that has spent too much time rehabilitating, changing roles and playing in fragmented combinations. The club has to decide which players are being developed as direct role cover, which are being developed as flexible system cover and which have a more specialised future.

A direct role cover is the simpler category. If Richmond has an outside wing whose role is to provide width, defend the outside release and connect the ball between arcs, the club should have another player training those same demands. That player may not have identical athleticism or ball use. He needs to understand the positioning and decision-making well enough to keep the lane functional.

Flexible system cover is different. A player may not replace a midfielder with another midfielder. He may replace the function by shifting the group. A forward can move higher to become the connector, allowing a wing to remain wider. A defender can rotate into the midfield safety layer, allowing another player to take the intercept role. A bigger midfielder can play forward at certain stoppages, changing the aerial mix while preserving the defensive balance around the ball.

Specialists still matter. Richmond cannot build a team entirely from interchangeable generalists. It needs its contested-ball winners, key defenders, key forwards and players with genuine point-of-difference traits. But the system around those specialists has to be broad enough that one absence does not make the side unrecognisable.

That is what the best 30 provides.

The midfield should be a portfolio, not a queue

The clearest place to apply this idea is the midfield.

Richmond has spent much of the recent period with a natural hierarchy at the source. Taranto has been the major contested-ball player. Hopper, when available, has offered another experienced inside presence. Ross has developed into a more credible senior contributor. Prestia’s retirement has removed an experienced organiser. The younger group is trying to find its place around those established players.

The obvious way to view this is as a queue. The senior midfielders step aside, then the young players take their turns.

That is not how a functional midfield should be built.

A midfield is a portfolio of responsibilities. The group needs ball-winning capacity, defensive-side protection, release running, pressure, outside connection and the ability to change the picture when an opponent has identified an advantage. Different players can carry different amounts of each responsibility. The point is that every function must exist even when an individual player does not.

Taranto’s 2026 season showed why Richmond still needs him central to this process. He averaged 24.8 disposals, 12.6 contested possessions, 6.4 clearances, 2.9 centre clearances, 4.1 inside 50s and 5.5 score involvements, while kicking 15 goals. He was Richmond’s highest-rated player through 16 rounds according to Champion Data. There is no argument for treating that output as a problem.

The problem is reliance.

If Taranto is the primary extractor, the main territory winner, the forward-half connector and the experienced midfield leader, Richmond becomes predictable. Opponents can plan for him. The young players can become passive around him, assuming the first ball is his responsibility. The team can appear to have depth because several players attend the centre bounce, while in reality the same player is carrying the work that matters most.

The best-30 solution is not to find another Taranto. It is to make his role one part of a more varied midfield portfolio.

Ross’s 2026 form gives Richmond an opportunity here. Through 16 rounds he averaged 23.2 disposals, 17.2 effective disposals, 11.1 contested possessions, 5.4 score involvements, 5.1 tackles and 4.5 clearances, and ranked second among Richmond players in Champion Data’s ratings. His value is not that he must become a second Taranto. It is that he can become a stabilising midfielder who wins enough of his own ball, tackles, connects possession and helps the group maintain its shape.

A player like Ross can make the rest of the midfield more portable. If Taranto is managed, Ross can take a greater share of the contested work without asking the entire team to change. If a younger player is given an attacking front-side role, Ross can provide balance. If the opponent is winning the same centre-bounce exit, Ross can become the player who changes the defensive-side setting or covers the next release.

That is what a good best-30 player does. He does not merely replace another name. He keeps the team’s responsibilities covered.

The younger group should be developed through the same lens. Lalor may become an explosive forward-side midfielder. Smillie may provide size, composure and a different stoppage profile. Campbell may become a dangerous connector between midfield and forward half rather than a full-time onballer. Kane McAuliffe may offer wing or midfield-running capacity depending on the shape required. Each player should be taught what function he is protecting for the team.

The club must avoid making every young midfielder compete for the same job. If every player is being judged by whether he can win the first clearance, Richmond will create duplication and ignore its own gaps. One player may be more valuable as a defensive-side midfielder. Another may be better as the clean release option. Another may be the wing who understands when to hold width and when to close the outside lane. Another may become the high half-forward who turns a contested win into a safe second possession.

This is not lowering the standard. It is raising it. Richmond should expect players to understand the effect of their role on the rest of the side, rather than merely producing individual output.

The forward line needs redundancy without sameness

The best-30 problem is just as important forward of the ball.

Richmond’s forward line is still trying to establish its long-term identity. The club has young tall prospects, experienced personnel whose availability has been inconsistent, medium forwards with different strengths and smaller players capable of adding pressure or finishing. The temptation is to identify the best three talls, best two smalls and best high half-forward, then assume the structure will settle once they all play together.

That is the best-23 version of the problem.

The best-30 version asks what happens when one of those players does not play.

Can Richmond still create a primary aerial contest? Can it still offer a high connection option? Can it still keep enough pressure behind the ball to make an intercept uncomfortable? Can it still divide the forward 50 in a way that gives the ball carrier a useful decision rather than a hopeful kick?

If the answer is no, the side has talent but not depth.

The young tall group needs time, but it also needs a system capable of surviving its interruptions. Faull’s season-ending back stress fractures and Armstrong’s foot bone stress removed two developing forward pieces at different stages, while Hotton’s pathway has involved both recovery and positional development. It would be easy to interpret those absences only as lost games for individual prospects. The larger cost was that Richmond could not repeatedly rehearse its future forward combinations.

A forward line becomes robust when players understand functional substitutes. One tall may be the primary target. If he misses, another player must know whether to take that role or whether the structure should change to a higher, more mobile forward line. A high half-forward may be the connection player. If he is unavailable, a wing or rotating midfielder should understand how to occupy that link. A pressure forward may be absent. The smalls and medium forwards must then know how to adjust their starting positions so the opposition does not receive a free exit after every intercept.

This is why selection should be less concerned with replacing a player like for like. Richmond may not have a direct replacement for every tall, every small or every runner. It needs replacements who can preserve the function through a slightly altered shape.

Suppose the Tigers are without a key forward. The answer may not be to force an inexperienced tall into the same deep role. Richmond might instead use a higher forward structure, ask a midfielder-forward to become the connecting target and instruct the remaining tall to work deeper only at certain entries. The smalls then need to adjust to a different ground-ball pattern, while the wings and half-backs need to understand that the attack will take an extra possession before entering.

That is not a weakened version of the same system. It is a system capable of changing without collapsing.

The consequence for development is that Richmond’s young forwards should not be taught only their preferred role. They need to understand the adjacent role well enough to keep the line functional. A young tall should know how to become the high contest when another tall is absent. A high half-forward should know how to play deeper when the side needs another marking option. A small forward should know when to stay at the fall and when to move up to close the opponent’s release.

The football will not always be as elegant as the best 23. It will be more useful over a season.

The backline cannot be built around emergency cover

Defensive depth is often described in terms of height. Can the side replace a key defender? Does it have enough aerial support? Can it handle a tall forward line if one of its better backs is unavailable?

Those are important questions. Richmond’s aerial vulnerability was exposed in the Round 20 loss to the Western Bulldogs, when the Bulldogs took 20 contested marks to Richmond’s five. The Tigers were thin for height, and Yze acknowledged that reality. But the best-30 issue is not simply whether Richmond has enough tall defenders on the list. It is whether the defensive system can keep functioning when the available profiles change.

A mature defence has layers. One player may be the key aerial stopper. Another may be the interceptor. Another may be the defender who provides running and rebound. Another may be the organiser who tells the others when to press and when to hold. If one is unavailable, the group needs to know which responsibilities shift and which remain.

A young defence often struggles because every absence forces a player to become something he is not. The intercept defender is asked to take the deepest key forward. The smaller stopper is asked to become the aerial spare. The half-back who normally provides rebound becomes so concerned about the defensive risk that he stops supporting attack. The side then appears to have lost ball movement and defensive reliability at once.

That is not simply a personnel problem. It is a role-allocation problem.

Richmond must develop enough defensive cross-training that its backline can adjust without abandoning its basic identity. A player does not have to become another Nick Vlastuin or another Noah Balta. But the group should know who becomes the spare, who owns the deepest threat, who can take the intercept role and who must provide the communication when a preferred defender is out.

The 2027 implication is that Richmond should give its young defenders deliberate exposure to adjacent responsibilities. A tall defender may need minutes as the spare rather than always taking the biggest forward. A rebounding half-back may need to experience the more conservative safety role. A medium defender may need to learn how to communicate a defensive handover when the ball is moving quickly. The club can then discover which players provide portable value and which require more specialised support around them.

This matters because the backline is often where a lack of depth becomes most costly. An injury or form change in the midfield can reduce the quality of possession. An injury or form change in defence can change the entire risk profile of the side. Richmond needs enough players who understand the safety system that the line can still press, intercept and support attack without treating every opponent entry as a potential disaster.

Availability is not the same as durability

Richmond’s injury problems in 2026 were extreme, but the club would be unwise to build its future on the assumption that the list will suddenly become untouched by absences. The better objective is durability at the system level.

Individual durability matters. The appointment of Selwyn Griffith from Melbourne’s high-performance department was a recognition that Richmond needed to improve its management of availability after ending the season with 11 players on the injury list. Better training loads, rehabilitation pathways, return-to-play decisions and monitoring can all improve the club’s ability to keep players available.

But system durability is different. It is the ability to retain the shape of the team when a player is not.

A club can improve its injury record and still be fragile if every absence changes the way it plays. Richmond’s 2027 plan therefore needs two parallel goals. The high-performance group must give the football department more stable availability. The football department must use that stability to train enough players in the same principles that an ordinary run of injuries does not send the season back into improvisation.

This is where the best-30 concept becomes more than selection language. It becomes a training principle.

The second-choice wing needs the same understanding of transition cover as the first-choice wing. The rotating midfielder needs enough exposure to the ruckman’s patterns that he can step into a centre-bounce role without guessing. The forward depth player needs to understand whether he is the high connector, the pressure player or the deeper contest in the absence of another forward. The defensive replacement needs to know the rules around pressing and safety, not merely his direct opponent.

The club should judge its depth players on that understanding. A player who performs adequately in isolation but repeatedly makes the system less connected may not provide the kind of depth Richmond needs. A player with less individual flair who preserves the structure may be more valuable over a season because he allows the rest of the side to remain itself.

This is often where rebuilding clubs make a subtle mistake. They select depth players based on the idea of individual reward or punishment, without considering the collective effect. The player who dominates at VFL level gets a senior game, which is reasonable. But if he is inserted into a role he does not understand, the entire line may change around him. Another player then has to cover his responsibility, which alters a third player’s task, and by the time the game begins the club has selected talent but lost its shape.

The best 30 prevents that. It does not eliminate changes. It makes changes legible.

Richmond should stop measuring depth by names

A depth chart is useful. It is also incomplete.

It can tell Richmond who the second and third options are at each nominal position. It cannot tell the club whether those players can preserve the strategic function of the first option. That requires a different form of evaluation.

The first question should be: what does the player’s role do for the team?

A midfielder may provide front-side clearance threat. Another may protect defensive side. A wing may create width and recovery cover. A high half-forward may connect the midfield to the attacking line. A key defender may take the deepest threat. A half-back may provide the intercept and transition link. A small forward may make the turnover survivable by pressuring the first outlet.

Once Richmond knows the function, it can identify who else can perform it.

That is where the club’s depth becomes real. The replacement does not have to look like the first-choice player. In some cases, a different profile may even improve a particular matchup. The key is that the group understands what responsibility remains covered and what trade-off has been accepted.

If a player cannot perform the same function, Richmond should not pretend the structure is unchanged. It should alter the shape deliberately. The club may use a safer forward entry because the pressure player is unavailable. It may hold a wing deeper because the midfield lacks its normal defensive-side cover. It may keep an additional defender behind the ball because the preferred interceptor is out. These are not admissions of defeat. They are evidence of a team that understands its own personnel.

The practical value of this approach is that it makes in-game adjustment possible. A side that knows its functions can respond when a player is injured during a match. It does not need to wait for the next week’s selection meeting. The midfield can redistribute responsibilities. The wing can change his starting position. The forward line can adjust its entry pattern. The defensive group can decide who becomes the safety layer.

That is how a team survives the season rather than merely surviving the week.

The VFL must become a system laboratory

Richmond’s VFL program was badly affected by the 2026 injury crisis. Naming only three AFL-listed players for a match because so many were unavailable is not the sort of detail a club wants to repeat. Yet the broader lesson should be useful.

The VFL cannot be treated merely as a place where players accumulate numbers and wait for a senior vacancy. It needs to become a system laboratory. The Tigers should use it to teach the same roles, terminology and structural principles the AFL side needs. That way, when a player is elevated, he is not being asked to learn a new team in the middle of the season.

A young midfielder in the VFL should know the AFL team’s centre-bounce language. He should know who attacks front side, who protects defensive side, what happens if the ruck tap is neutralised and where the wing is expected to provide the next connection. A developing forward should understand the AFL side’s high connection rules and its pressure response after an intercept. A young defender should know the team’s transition safety settings and its methods for responding to an opponent’s corridor exit.

This does not mean the VFL must rigidly mimic the AFL side in every tactical detail. The teams will have different opponents, different player availability and different development priorities. It means that the core football language should transfer.

The benefit is not only that a player can step in more smoothly. It also improves the quality of Richmond’s list assessment. If the VFL player is being asked to perform a comparable role, the club can better judge whether his form is transferable. A midfielder who dominates a different, simplified role may not be ready for the AFL task. A player whose numbers are modest but whose positioning and decision-making fit the senior system may be closer than the stat line suggests.

For Richmond, this is an important way to turn the pain of 2026 into a useful change. The club has seen what happens when availability forces a player into the senior side before the surrounding structure can support him. The answer is not to become more conservative with opportunity. It is to make opportunity more prepared.

What success looks like in 2027

Richmond does not need a fully settled best 23 by the end of 2027. The list is still young, the forward structure is still emerging and some of the most important players will continue to develop unevenly. A rebuild that pretends every answer must be final by one deadline usually ends up making decisions for emotional comfort rather than football sense.

The club should, however, have a far clearer best 30.

It should know which midfield roles are portable. If Taranto misses, who becomes the primary contest player, who protects defensive side and who provides the release? If Ross is unavailable, who becomes the connective stabiliser? If a young midfielder is asked to attend more centre bounces, what exact responsibility is he taking on?

It should know which forward functions are covered. If a tall is absent, does Richmond become a higher, more mobile forward line, or does another player take the deep contest? Who provides the high link? Who sets the pressure behind the entry? How does the midfield alter its kicking pattern to suit the available group?

It should know which defenders can shift responsibilities without losing the safety structure. If the key stopper is unavailable, who becomes the spare? If the intercept defender is missing, who holds that role? If the team needs more height, what does it sacrifice in rebound and how is that sacrifice protected elsewhere?

It should know which wings can connect the game and recover defensively. It should know which VFL players understand the AFL system well enough to enter without causing a complete reorganisation. It should know which young players are developing toward a primary role and which are valuable because they can cover multiple functions.

Those are the signs of a club moving from a promising list to a sustainable side.

The Tigers’ 2026 injury crisis made the lack of system depth painfully visible. That was the immediate consequence. The more useful consequence is that Richmond now has a clear reason to build differently. The club must not simply chase the best possible 23 and hope it remains fit. It needs to create a wider group capable of protecting the same football identity when the inevitable changes arrive.

The next Richmond side will not be defined by how impressive it looks on the day every player is available. It will be defined by how recognisable it remains when they are not.

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